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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Gregory W. Smith and Stephanie Smith, Respondents, 
v. 
D.R. Horton, Inc., Tom's Vinyl Siding, LLC, Lutzen 

Construction, Inc., Boozer Lumber Company, All 

American Roofing, Inc., Myers Landscaping, Inc., 

Defendants, 

of whom D.R. Horton, Inc. is the Petitioner. 
Appellate Case No. 2013-001345 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Appeal From Dorchester County 

Edgar W. Dickson, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 27645 

Heard March 3, 2015 – Filed July 6, 2016 

AFFIRMED 
Matthew Kinard Johnson and W. Kyle Dillard, both of 
Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart, PC, of 
Greenville, for Petitioner. 
Phillip Ward Segui, Jr., of Segui Law Firm, of Mt. 
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Pleasant, John T. Chakeris, of Chakeris Law Firm, and 
Michael A. Timbes, of Thurmond Kirchner Timbes & 
Yelverton, PA, both of Charleston, for Respondents. 
ACTING JUSTICE TOAL: D.R. Horton, Inc., asks this Court to reverse the 
court of appeals' decision in Smith v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 403 S.C. 10, 742 S.E.2d 37 
(Ct. App. 2013), affirming the circuit court's refusal to compel arbitration between 
Gregory and Stephanie Smith (collectively, the Smiths) and D.R. Horton.  We 
affirm. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
D.R. Horton is a corporation specializing in residential construction.  In 
March 2005, the Smiths entered into a home purchase agreement (the Agreement) 
with D.R. Horton for the design and construction of a new home in Summerville, 
South Carolina. 
The Agreement is organized into numbered paragraphs and lettered 
subparagraphs, and sets forth the various responsibilities of the parties prior to and 
immediately following closing.1  Paragraph 14 of the Agreement is titled 
"Warranties and Dispute Resolution," and consists of subparagraphs 14(a) through 
14(j). Subparagraphs 14(c) and 14(g) contain provisions stating that the parties 
agree to arbitrate any claim arising out of D.R. Horton's construction of the home, 
as well as any disputes related to the warranties contained in the Agreement.  
However, in the majority of the remaining subparagraphs of paragraph 14, D.R. 
Horton expressly disclaims all warranties for the home—including the implied 
warranty of habitability—except for a ten-year structural warranty.  Moreover, 
subparagraph 14(i) stipulates that D.R. Horton "shall not be liable for monetary 
damages of any kind, including secondary, consequential, punitive, general, special
or indirect damages."  (Emphasis in original). 
In August 2005, D.R. Horton completed construction of the Smiths' home, 
1 For example, the Agreement requires the Smiths to obtain suitable financing to 
purchase the home prior to the start of construction and to deposit a specified 
amount of earnest money, and requires D.R. Horton to convey marketable title to 
the Smiths at the closing.
13 

  
                                        
and the Smiths closed on the property and received the deed.  Thereafter, the 
Smiths experienced a myriad of problems with the home that resulted in severe 
water damage to the property.  D.R. Horton attempted to repair the alleged 
construction defects on "numerous occasions" during the next five years, but was 
ultimately unsuccessful. 
In 2010, the Smiths filed a construction defect case against D.R. Horton and 
seven subcontractors.  In response, D.R. Horton filed a motion to compel 
arbitration. The Smiths opposed the motion, arguing, inter alia, that the arbitration 
agreement was unconscionable and therefore unenforceable. 
The circuit court denied D.R. Horton's motion to compel arbitration, finding 
that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable.  The court based its ruling on "a 
number of oppressive and one-sided provisions," including D.R. Horton's 
attempted waiver of the implied warranty of habitability, as well as subparagraph 
14(i)'s prohibition on awarding money damages of any kind against D.R. Horton.  
D.R. Horton made a motion to reconsider pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCACR, but the 
circuit court again denied the motion to compel.2  
D.R. Horton appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
order. See Smith, 403 S.C. at 10, 742 S.E.2d at 37.  The court of appeals found the 
arbitration agreement was unconscionable, citing subparagraph 14(i) and its 
prohibition on awarding money damages against D.R. Horton.  Id. at 15, 742 
S.E.2d at 40–41.   Further, the court of appeals sua sponte conducted a severability 
analysis to determine whether subparagraph 14(i) could be severed from the 
remaining provisions of the arbitration agreement.  Id. at 17, 742 S.E.2d at 41. The 
court of appeals ultimately concluded that severing the subparagraph would be 
inappropriate. Id. 
D.R. Horton petitioned the court of appeals for rehearing, asserting that the 
court of appeals made two fundamental errors.  First, D.R. Horton argued that the 
court of appeals' unconscionability analysis was flawed because it did not discuss 
whether the Smiths lacked a meaningful choice in entering the arbitration 
2 In the second order denying D.R. Horton's motion to compel arbitration, the court 
elaborated on its previous finding of unconscionability, finding that the Agreement 
was a contract of adhesion, and that the Smiths had significantly less bargaining 
power than D.R. Horton. 
14 

  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
 
 
agreement.  See Simpson v. MSA of Myrtle Beach, Inc., 373 S.C. 14, 24–25, 644 
S.E.2d 663, 668 (2007) (stating that an unconscionability analysis has two prongs, 
one of which is whether one of the parties to the contract lacked a meaningful 
choice in agreeing to arbitrate (citing Carolina Care Plan, Inc. v. United 
HealthCare Servs., Inc., 361 S.C. 544, 554, 606 S.E.2d 752, 757 (2004); S.C. Code 
Ann. § 36-2-302(1) (1976))).
Second, D.R. Horton asserted that the court of appeals' decision violated the 
United States Supreme Court's holding in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin 
Manufacturing Co. See 388 U.S. 395, 406 (1967) (holding that courts may only 
consider the threshold question of whether the arbitration agreement is 
fraudulently induced and thus invalid, not whether the contract as a whole is 
invalid); see also S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. Great W. Coal (Ky.), Inc., 312 S.C. 559, 
562–63, 437 S.E.2d 22, 24 (1993) (adopting a broad interpretation of Prima Paint
in South Carolina, and holding that "a party cannot avoid arbitration through 
rescission of the entire contract when there is no independent challenge to the 
arbitration clause" (the Prima Paint doctrine)). In D.R. Horton's view, the 
arbitration agreement was contained exclusively in subparagraph 14(g), and 
therefore, the court of appeals' consideration of the allegedly one-sided terms in 
subparagraph 14(i) was inappropriate.3 
Ultimately, the court of appeals denied the petition for rehearing, and we 
granted D.R. Horton's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals'
decision. 
ISSUE
Whether the arbitration agreement is unconscionable? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Arbitrability determinations are subject to de novo review.  Bradley v. 
Brentwood Homes, Inc., 398 S.C. 447, 453, 730 S.E.2d 312, 315 (2012).  However,
3 In conjunction with this argument, D.R. Horton also asserted that a severability 
analysis was inappropriate because the portions of the Agreement that the court of 
appeals considered severing were not actually part of the arbitration agreement, 
i.e., were not part of subparagraph 14(g).
15 

  
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
a circuit court's factual findings will not be reversed on appeal if any evidence 
reasonably supports the findings.  Id. at 453, 730 S.E.2d at 315. 
ANALYSIS
I. The Prima Paint Doctrine 
As an initial matter, we address D.R. Horton's argument regarding the court 
of appeals' alleged failure to heed the Prima Paint doctrine.4 
In Prima Paint, the Supreme Court held that to avoid arbitration, a party 
must assert a contractual defense to the arbitration agreement itself, and not to the 
contract as a whole.  See 388 U.S. at 406. Thus, for example, a party must allege 
that the arbitration agreement is unconscionable, not that the entire contract is 
unconscionable. See S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth., 312 S.C. at 562–63, 437 S.E.2d at 24. 
Similarly, in conducting an unconscionability inquiry, courts may only consider 
the provisions of the arbitration agreement itself, and not those of the whole 
contract. 
Here, the parties fundamentally disagree on the application of the Prima 
Paint doctrine to the Agreement.  D.R. Horton asserts that the arbitration 
agreement is wholly contained in subparagraph 14(g).  Therefore, according to 
D.R. Horton, the Court may not consider any of the remaining subparagraphs of 
paragraph 14—such as subparagraph 14(i)'s damages limitation—in determining 
whether the arbitration agreement is unconscionable.  We disagree. 
Like the lower courts, we construe the entirety of paragraph 14, entitled 
"Warranties and Dispute Resolution," as the arbitration agreement.  As the title 
indicates, all the subparagraphs of paragraph 14 must be read as a whole to 
understand the scope of the warranties and how different disputes are to be 
handled. The subparagraphs within paragraph 14 contain numerous cross-
references to one another, intertwining the subparagraphs so as to constitute a 
single provision. 
4 As will be explained further, infra, we must address this issue first because it 
controls which portions of the Agreement we may properly consider in conducting 
our unconscionability analysis. 
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Thus, in accordance with the Prima Paint doctrine, we find that in 
determining whether the arbitration agreement is unconscionable, we may properly 
consider the entirety of paragraph 14. 
 
II. Unconscionability 
"In South Carolina, unconscionability is defined as the absence of 
meaningful choice on the part of one party due to one-sided contract provisions, 
together with terms that are so oppressive that no reasonable person would make 
them and no fair and honest person would accept them."  Simpson, 373 S.C. at 24– 
25, 644 S.E.2d at 668 (citations omitted)).5  
Whether one party lacks a meaningful choice in entering the arbitration 
agreement at issue typically speaks to the fundamental fairness of the bargaining 
process. Gladden v. Boykin, 402 S.C. 140, 148, 739 S.E.2d 882, 886 (2013) 
(quoting Simpson, 373 S.C. at 25, 644 S.E.2d at 669).  Thus, parties frequently 
allege they lacked a meaningful choice when the dispute involves an adhesion 
contract. See Munoz v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 343 S.C. 531, 541, 542 S.E.2d 360, 
365 (2001) (defining adhesion contracts as "standard form contract[s] offered on a 
take-it or leave-it basis with terms that are not negotiable").  While adhesion 
contracts are not unconscionable per se, courts tend to look upon them with 
"considerable skepticism" because they give rise to "considerable doubt that any 
true agreement ever existed to submit disputes to arbitration."  Id. at 26–27, 644 
S.E.2d at 669–70 (quotation marks omitted).  In determining whether a party 
lacked a meaningful choice to arbitrate, courts should consider, inter alia, the 
relative disparity in the parties' bargaining power, the parties' relative 
sophistication, whether the parties were represented by independent counsel, and 
whether "'the plaintiff is a substantial business concern.'"  Id. (quoting Simpson, 
373 S.C. at 25, 644 S.E.2d at 669). 
"We have [] taken judicial cognizance of the fact that a modern buyer of new 
5 We note that the court of appeals addressed only the allegedly oppressive nature 
of the terms found in the arbitration agreement, but appears not to have considered 
whether the Smiths lacked a meaningful choice in agreeing to arbitrate.  We 
caution courts and parties in the future to analyze both prongs of unconscionability. 
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residential housing is normally in an unequal bargaining position as against the 
seller." Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Mfg. Co., 299 S.C. 335, 343, 384 S.E.2d 
730, 735–36 (1989); cf. Sapp v. Ford Motor Co., 386 S.C. 143, 147–48, 687 S.E.2d 
47, 49–50 (2009) (stating that South Carolina's "courts have shifted from following 
the doctrine of caveat emptor ('let the buyer beware') to the doctrine of caveat 
venditor ('let the seller beware')").  There is no indication in the record that the 
Smiths enjoyed a substantially stronger bargaining position against D.R. Horton 
than the average homebuyer, or that they were represented by independent counsel.  
Moreover, the Smiths were a single client to a corporation that constructs houses in 
twenty-seven states. Thus, the Smiths were also not a substantial business concern 
of D.R. Horton, as they did not comprise a large portion of D.R. Horton's clientele. 
Accordingly, we find that the Smiths lacked a meaningful choice in their 
ability to negotiate the arbitration clause in the Agreement. 
Moreover, in considering the actual provisions of the arbitration agreement, 
we find that D.R. Horton's attempts to disclaim implied warranty claims and 
prohibit any monetary damages are clearly one-sided and oppressive.  Under the 
terms of paragraph 14, the only remedy provided for a defect in the home is repair 
or replacement—options left entirely in the discretion of D.R. Horton.  This is no 
remedy at all because it leaves the relief to the whim of D.R. Horton while 
simultaneously allowing no monetary recuperation when, as here, the repairs are 
simply inadequate.  We therefore affirm the court of appeals and hold the 
arbitration provision is unconscionable and thus unenforceable.6 
6 Because the arbitration agreement does not contain a severability clause, we find 
the parties did not intend for the Court to strike unconscionable provisions from the 
arbitration agreement.  Thus, we decline to analyze whether the unconscionable 
provisions are severable, as doing so would be the result of the Court rewriting the
parties' contract rather than enforcing their stated intentions.  See Simpson, 373 
S.C. at 34, 644 S.E.2d at 673. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the court of appeals is 
AFFIRMED. 
BEATTY and HEARN, JJ., concur. KITTREDGE, J., dissenting in a 
separate opinion in which PLEICONES, C.J. concurs. 
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JUSTICE KITTREDGE:  The underlying contract involves interstate commerce 
and, as a result, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) controls.  Because I believe the 
majority has not followed controlling precedent of the United States Supreme 
Court, I respectfully dissent.  In my judgment, state law does not provide a valid 
basis to avoid enforcing this particular agreement to arbitrate, and the court of 
appeals erred in upholding the circuit court's refusal to compel arbitration.  I would 
reverse. 
I. 
This arbitration agreement is subject to the FAA, a fact conspicuously absent in the 
majority opinion. "'Generally, any arbitration agreement affecting interstate 
commerce is subject to the FAA.'" Cape Romain Contractors, Inc. v. Wando E., 
LLC, 405 S.C. 115, 121–22, 747 S.E.2d 461, 464 (2013) (quoting Landers v. 
Federal Deposit Ins. Co., 402 S.C. 100, 108, 739 S.E.2d 209, 213 (2013)).  "The 
United States Supreme Court 'has previously described the [FAA]'s reach 
expansively as coinciding with that of the Commerce Clause.'"  Id. at 122, 747 
S.E.2d at 464 (quoting Allied–Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 274 
(1995)). "Thus, in determining whether the FAA applies to a particular arbitration 
agreement, a court considers whether the contract concerns a transaction involving 
interstate commerce." Id. (citing Episcopal Housing Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 269 
S.C. 631, 637, 239 S.E.2d 647, 650 (1977)).   
In support of its motion to compel arbitration, D.R. Horton submitted affidavits 
from several executives indicating that D.R. Horton is a Delaware corporation with 
its principal place of business in Texas.  These affidavits further establish D.R. 
Horton is engaged in the residential construction business in twenty-seven states 
and that many of the building materials and supplies used in constructing the 
Smiths' home in Summerville were obtained from suppliers outside South 
Carolina.7  Because the arbitration clause at issue here is included in a contract that 
evidences a transaction involving interstate commerce, the FAA governs the 
enforceability of the arbitration provision. See Cape Romain, 405 S.C. at 123–24, 
747 S.E.2d at 465 (citing Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 346 S.C. 580, 594–95, 
7 These materials include rebar, framing materials, wall sheathing, windows, 
gypsum drywall, shingles, cabinets, carpet, vinyl flooring, plumbing fixtures, 
lighting hardware, and appliances.   
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553 S.E.2d 110, 117–18 (2001); Episcopal Housing, 269 S.C. at 640, 239 S.E.2d 
647 S.E.3d at 652) (observing that out-of-state materials used in construction were 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce); see also Zabinski, 346 S.C. at 594, 553 
S.E.2d at 117 (relying upon affidavits in determining whether a transaction 
involves interstate commerce).   
II. 
The FAA requires that an arbitration agreement "shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation 
of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2.  The United States Supreme Court has construed 
section 2 of the FAA as permitting "agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by 
generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability."  
AT & T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011).  However, this 
provision of the FAA has been narrowly construed.   
Moreover, "[a] recurring question under § 2 [of the FAA] is who should decide 
whether grounds exist at law or in equity to invalidate an arbitration agreement."  
Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 353 (2008) (internal quotations omitted).  The 
United States Supreme Court has determined that "unless the challenge is to the 
arbitration clause itself, the issue of the contract's validity is considered by the 
arbitrator in the first instance." Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 
U.S. 440, 445–46 (2006) (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 
388 U.S. 395 (1967)). Indeed, absent a "discreet challenge to the validity of the 
arbitration clause," federal law establishes that challenges to the validity of 
contractual provisions "are within the arbitrator's ken."  Preston, 552 U.S. at 353– 
54. 
"[W]hen parties commit to arbitrate contractual disputes, it is a mainstay of the 
[FAA]'s substantive law that attacks on the validity of the contract, as distinct from
attacks on the validity of the arbitration clause itself, are to be resolved by the 
arbitrator in the first instance . . . ."  Nitro-Lift Techs., LLC, v. Howard, 133 S.Ct. 
500, 503 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Preston, 552 U.S. at 
349; Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403–04). The permissible scope of the initial 
judicial inquiry is "highly circumscribed" and must relate "specifically to the 
arbitration clause." Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th
Cir. 1999).  If the arbitration provision is found to be valid (or is not challenged), 
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then the validity of the remainder of the contract is for the arbitrator to decide.  
Nitro-Lift, 133 S.Ct. at 503.  Moreover, "this arbitration law applies in state as well 
as federal courts."  Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 446.  Simply put, courts—state or 
federal—may decide only the question of whether the parties validly agreed to 
arbitrate the dispute that has arisen; controversies as to the enforceability of any 
other contractual provision(s)—including those which may be so objectionable as 
to undermine the contract in its entirety—are to be resolved by the arbitrator. 
 
Here, the majority acknowledges this point of law, as it must. However, the 
majority nevertheless adopts the findings of the trial court, which circumvent the 
application of these legal principles by expanding the relevant scope of the 
contractual language at issue to include matters beyond the arbitration provision.  
This is accomplished by the fiction that the arbitration provision is the entirety of 
Paragraph 14, which contains more than 1,800 words.  Indeed, the following is the 
portion of the parties' contract the majority finds to constitute the "arbitration 
provision": 
 
14. WARRANTIES AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
 
a. Structural Warranty.  At Closing, Seller shall execute and deliver to 
Purchaser at no additional cost a warranty from Residential Warranty 
Corporation ("RWC") or such other national warranty provider as Seller 
may reasonably elect (the "RWC Warranty").  This RWC Warranty will 
provide, at a minimum, a ten (10) year structural warranty.  The RWC 
Warranty referred to in this paragraph is the only warranty being made 
by Seller, except for such warranties which may not be disclaimed by 
State or Federal law.  In addition, Seller hereby assigns to Purchaser all 
warranties, expressed or implied, which arise or are given by the 
manufacturer of any product installed in the home built on the Property. 
 
b. RWC Warranty.  Purchaser has been, or will be prior to Closing, 
provided with a copy of the RWC Warranty book on the Ten Year 
Limited Warranty, which is administered by the Residential Warranty 
Corporation. Validation of the RWC Warranty is conditioned upon the 
Seller's compliance with all RWC's enrollment procedures and upon 
Seller remaining in good standing in the RWC Program. 
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c. The RWC Warranty is provided by Seller to Purchaser in lieu of all 
other warranties, verbal agreements, or representations and Seller 
makes no warranty, express or implied, as to quality, fitness for a 
particular purpose, merchantability, habitability or otherwise, except 
as is expressly set forth in the Program or as otherwise required by 
Federal or State law.  Particularly, Purchaser understands and 
agrees that any and all complaints of any nature in regard to the 
property that arise more than 365 days after closing must be 
submitted to RWC.  Purchaser understands and agrees that the 
warranties of all appliances and other consumer products installed in the 
home are those of the manufacturer or supplier and same are assigned to 
Purchaser, effective on the date of Closing.  In any event, Seller shall not 
be liable for any personal injury or other consequential or secondary 
damages and/or losses, which may arise from or out of any and all 
defects. Except for purchasers of FHA or VA financed homes, 
Purchaser acknowledges and understands that the RWC Warranty 
includes a provision requiring all disputes that arise under the RWC 
Warranty to be submitted to binding arbitration.  Purchaser has 
been, or will be given prior to Closing, provided with a copy of the D.R. 
Horton Warranty manual, "Foundations."  Purchaser understands and 
agrees to all warranties to their extent as outlined in said manual.  
Purchaser shall execute an acknowledgement that Seller makes no 
warranties express or implied, as to fitness for a particular purpose, 
merchantability, and habitability as set forth above at Closing, which 
statement shall be affixed to Purchaser's deed. 
 
Purchaser Initial(s): s/GS s/SM 
 
d. Exclusions.  The following are excluded from all warranties provided 
by Seller: (i) those matters excluded in the RWC Warranty documents; 
(ii) those matters excluded in sub-paragraph (f) below, and (iii) the 
following matters: 
 
Landscaping, including trees, shrubs, grass and flowers are not 
covered by any warranty.  All grading, fill, landscaping, disposition of 
trees and control of water flow shall be constructed and maintained at 
the sole discretion of Seller prior to Closing.  Grading and drainage 
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are not covered by any warranty nor will they be maintained or 
modified by Seller after closing in any way whatsoever UNLESS the 
grading or drainage is found to be in violation of the applicable 
provision of the South Carolina Residential Construction Standards.  
Many areas will be left in their natural state and will not be 
landscaped in any way. As of the date and time of Closing, Seller 
shall have no further responsibility for soil erosion, the growth of 
grass, death of trees, grass or shrubbery, or soil conditions. Seller is 
not liable for trees or shrubs, or damage or destruction to same.  Seller 
makes no warranty whatsoever as to the type, location or amount of 
trees, which will exist on the property after construction.  Seller will 
plant grass seeds or install sod, as the case may be, as part of its 
construction. Because the growth of grass seeds and the health of sod 
is dependent on Purchaser's care and maintenance, no warranty is 
provided and all grass is installed "as-is."  Because prevention of 
erosion is dependent on Purchaser's proper maintenance of the grass 
and sod, Seller provides no warranty for erosion.  Purchaser's closing 
of the sale constitutes an acceptance of Seller's drainage and erosion 
controls for the Property, except for matters noted on Purchaser's 
"Punch list."  Seller shall not be responsible for the correction of any 
leakage or seepage caused by (i) damaged water pipes or mains, (ii) 
alteration of the landscaping by a party other than Seller (specifically 
including, without limitation, any changes which cause water to flow 
toward the dwelling), or (iii) prolonged direction of water against the 
outside foundation wall from a spigot, sprinkler, hose, or improperly 
maintained gutters or down spouts.  Seller will not warrant any 
cosmetic defect post-closing unless this condition is listed on the 
"punch list" prior to Closing.  Examples of "cosmetic defects" include 
sheetrock dings, dimples and nail pops, paint discoloration, chips or 
irregularities in marble, Formica, or tile.  Unless a defect is noted on 
the "punch list," Seller does not warrant the installation or the quality 
of any carpet or flooring product (however, note that Seller assigns the 
manufacturer warranties to Purchaser at Closing). 
 
Purchaser Initial(s): s/GS s/SM 
 
e. Existing Trees:  D.R. Horton will make every effort to save as many 
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existing trees as possible during the construction process.  Those trees 
that must be removed will be removed at the sole discretion of the Area 
Manager and their Field Manager.  D.R. Horton reserves the right to 
remove any trees, which in their judgment may have roots damaged by 
construction to the extent that the tree would not be expected to live.  
Those trees that are in or within close vicinity of the home's footprint or 
concrete flatwork area will be removed.  Additionally, trees that impede 
the drainage of the site, or overall community drainage plan will be 
removed.  D.R. Horton does not guarantee the health, survival or growth 
of any tree after closing. Repairs to living trees and removal or 
replacement of dead trees at any time after closing is the responsibility 
of the buyer unless requested before closing, agreed upon, and noted in 
writing at the "Pre-settlement Orientation Inspection." 
Purchaser Initial(s): s/GS s/SM 
f. Landscaping. D.R. Horton does not guarantee the continued health, 
growth or life of any landscape components after closing.  Survival of 
landscaping components (trees, bushes, plants, sod, seed etc.) after 
closing is the buyer's responsibility.  No landscaping items will be 
replaced or repaired after closing unless noted in writing and agreed 
upon at the "Pre-settlement Orientation Inspection."  Landscaping 
requires a continuous maintenance program, which includes proper 
watering, fertilization, mowing and weed control.  Deficiencies, other 
than those noted prior to closing, will not be warranted by D.R. Horton.  
Upon closing, all maintenance is the responsibility of the buyer.  The 
buyer is responsible for any damage due to neglect or inadequate 
maintenance.  Wetland, wetland buffers and wooded natural areas
throughout the Community will be left "as is."  Buyer understands that 
"standing water" beyond 40'-0" of the home may occur in wetland, 
wetland buffers and wooded natural areas.  Maintenance and repair of 
the aforementioned areas are the sole responsibility of the Buyer after 
closing. Clearing and disturbance of natural areas in order to provide 
underground utility services to the home may be necessary.  These areas 
will be left un-landscaped and allowed to return to their natural state.  
The remaining undisturbed area will be left in its natural state.   
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Purchaser Initial(s): s/GS s/SM 
 
g. MANDATORY BINDING ARBITRATION.  Purchaser and Seller 
each agree that, to the maximum extent allowed by law, they desire to 
arbitrate all disputes between themselves.  The list of disputes which 
shall be arbitrated in accordance with this paragraph include, but are not 
limited to: (1) any claim arising out of Seller's construction of the home; 
(2) Seller's performance under any Punch List or Inspection Agreement; 
(3) Seller's performance under any warranty contained in this Agreement 
or otherwise; and (4) any other matters as to which Purchaser and Seller 
agree to arbitrate. 
 
i. If the arbitration arises out of a claim arising under the RWC 
Warranty, the rules, terms and conditions in the RWC Warranty 
certificate and related materials delivered to Purchaser shall control. 
 
ii. If the arbitration arises out of any claim other than a claim under 
the RWC Warranty, then the arbitration shall be conducted in 
Charleston/Dorchester/Berkeley County, South Carolina.  The 
arbitrations shall be conducted by an arbitrator or panel of arbitrators 
agreed upon by the parties, and to the extent possible, the proceeding 
shall be conducted under rules, which provide for an expedited 
hearing. The filing fee for such arbitration shall be paid by the party 
filing the arbitration demand, but the arbitrator shall have the right to 
assess or allocate the filing fees and any other costs of the arbitration 
as part of the arbitrator's final order.  The arbitration referred to in this 
paragraph shall be binding and any party shall have the right to seek 
judicial enforcement of the arbitration award. 
 
Purchaser Initial(s): s/GS s/SM 
 
h. In addition to the rights and obligations of each party specified in 
subparagraphs (a)–(d) above, in the event that a bona fide dispute, as 
determined by the Seller, should arise between Purchaser and Seller 
prior to the Closing Date, and such dispute cannot in good faith be 
resolved completely and to the mutual satisfaction of all parties within 
ten (10) days after the beginning of the dispute, then Seller shall have the 
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right, upon written notice to Purchaser, to terminate this Agreement and 
return the Earnest Money to Purchaser, and no cause of action shall 
accrue on behalf of Purchaser because of such termination. 
 
i. Limitation of liability. EXCEPT FOR THE RWC WARRANTY, 
AND EXCEPT FOR THE TITLE WARRANTIES SPECIFIED IN 
PARAGRAPH 4 ABOVE, AND EXCEPT FOR ANY 
WARRANTIES IMPOSED BY LAW, WHICH CANNOT BE 
DISCLAIMED, SELLER MAKES NO OTHER WARRANTY OF 
ANY KIND, ALL SUCH OTHER WARRANTIES ARE HEREBY 
DISCLAIMED BY SELLER.  SELLER MAKES NO WARRANTY AS 
TO MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 
PURPOSE, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED.  THE 
EXCLUSIVE REMEDY FOR ANY DEFECT OF ANY ITEM OR 
CLAIMED DEFECT IN THE HOME IS BY WRITTEN 
NOTIFICATION PRIOR TO THE EXPIRATION OF THE 
WARRANTY PERIOD. SELLER'S OBLIGATION SHALL BE 
THE CORRECTION OF SUCH DEFECT BY REPAIR OR 
REPLACEMENT, IN ITS DISCRETION.  NO SUCH ACTIONS 
TAKEN BY SELLER TO REPAIR OR REPLACE A DEFECT 
SHALL EXTEND THE WARRANTY PERIOD.  SELLER SHALL 
NOT BE LIABLE FOR MONETARY DAMAGES OF ANY KIND, 
INCLUDING SECONDARY, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE, 
GENERAL, SPECIAL OR INDIRECT DAMAGES. 
 
j. Requests for warranty service within the first 365 days after closing, 
must be in writing and faxed, mailed, or delivered to Seller at Seller's 
address as indicated below Seller's signature on this Agreement. Verbal 
requests to Seller's staff are not acceptable.  Such requests must comply 
with all applicable law and must state the nature of the problem with 
particularity. Seller has 30 days to determine whether such request will 
be fulfilled. 
italicization added). 
n seeking to avoid arbitration on the basis of unconscionability, the Smiths 
laimed the italicized language in the above excerpt represents D.R. Horton's 
(
I
c
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attempt to disclaim certain implied warranties and to eliminate liability for 
monetary damages, the terms of which are unfairly oppressive and one-sided.  
However, in opposing arbitration, the Smiths do not challenge any provision of 
subparagraph (g) titled "MANDATORY BINDING ARBITRATION."  More to 
the point, the Smiths do not contend the specific agreement to arbitrate was 
unconscionable. 
As noted, federal law requires that unless the claim of unconscionability goes to 
the arbitration clause itself, the issue of enforceability must be resolved by the 
arbitrator, not by the courts.  Thus, courts can consider unconscionability 
challenges only when they relate to the issue of whether the parties agreed to 
arbitrate disputes in the first place. See Sydnor v. Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp., 
252 F.3d 302, 305 (4th Cir. 2001) ("Principles of equity may counsel for 
invalidation of an arbitration agreement if the grounds for revocation relate 
specifically to the arbitration clause.  . . . However, when claims allege
unconscionability of the contract generally, these issues are determined by an 
arbitrator because the dispute pertains to the formation of the entire contract, rather 
than the arbitration agreement." (citing Hooters of America, 173 F.3d at 938; 
Coleman v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 802 F.2d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 1986))).
Here, the majority circumvents controlling federal law by construing the entirety of 
paragraph fourteen—i.e. all ten separately denominated subparagraphs—as 
comprising the arbitration agreement.  In attempting to justify such a construction, 
the majority cites no supporting authority, instead reasoning that the contract 
groups warranties and dispute resolution together under a single heading 
"Warranties and Dispute Resolution" and that "[t]he subparagraphs within 
paragraph 14 contain numerous cross-references to one another, intertwining the 
paragraphs so as to constitute a single provision."  Indeed, it is only by treating 
paragraph fourteen as a single, indivisible provision that the majority is able to 
transform the Smiths' objection to certain warranty and liability disclaimers into a 
challenge to the arbitration provision, only the latter being proper for judicial rather 
than arbitral determination.   
I reject the majority's construction that the arbitration provision is the entirety of 
paragraph fourteen. In my judgment, under well-established state law, paragraph 
fourteen is comprised of numerous severable provisions, which include not only 
the parties' mutual promise to settle any disputes through arbitration, but also 
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various other distinct provisions, including D.R. Horton's promise to provide a ten-
year structural warranty, D.R. Horton's promise to assign appliance manufacturer 
warranties to the Smiths, mutual promises regarding which party is responsible for 
landscaping maintenance at various points in time, and the Smiths' promise to give 
written notice of any warranty claims in accordance with specified procedures, 
among many other things.   
Specifically, I believe the challenged warranty disclaimers and liability limitations 
are separate and distinct from the agreement to arbitrate, in terms of both 
formatting and subject matter.  Indeed, not only does the parties' chosen paragraph 
structure and subparagraph denomination spatially delineate these provisions as 
separate from the agreement to arbitrate, but also the gravamen of each of these 
terms is distinct and independently operative.  Consequently, as a matter of South 
Carolina law, these provisions are properly viewed as discrete terms rather than as 
a cohesive contractual provision. See Columbia Architectural Grp., Inc. v. Barker, 
274 S.C. 639, 641, 266 S.E.2d 428, 429 (1980) (explaining that a "severable 
contract is one in its nature and purpose susceptible of division and apportionment, 
having two or more parts, in respect to matters and things contemplated and 
embraced by it, not necessarily dependent upon each other, nor is it intended by the 
parties that they shall be," and finding a lump-sum contract for services involved 
severable provisions despite interdependence of material terms); Packard & Field 
v. Byrd, 73 S.C. 1, 51 S.E. 678, 680 (1905) (finding contract terms relating to the 
seller's promise to deliver shoes and the buyer's promise to purchase shoes were 
distinct and severable, and therefore enforceable, despite the presence of other 
contractual provisions which were deemed unenforceable as against public policy); 
Beach Co. v. Twillman, Ltd., 351 S.C. 56, 65, 566 S.E.2d 863, 867 (Ct. App. 2002) 
(finding a single subparagraph was comprised of three discrete provisions because 
"separate and distinct rights" were implicated in each provision).
Further, I emphasize the fact that the Smiths separately initialed subparagraph (g) 
titled "MANDATORY BINDING ARBITRATION" (and four other subparagraphs 
within paragraph fourteen), which in my judgment indicates the parties themselves 
viewed these terms as distinct contractual provisions to which they separately 
consented. See Schulmeyer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 353 S.C. 491, 495, 579 
S.E.2d 132, 134 (2003) (noting "[t]he cardinal rule of contract interpretation is to 
ascertain and give legal effect to the parties' intentions" (citation omitted)); 
Columbia Architectural Group., 274 S.C. at 641, 266 S.E.2d at 429 ("The entirety 
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or severability of a contract depends primarily upon the intent of the parties rather 
than upon the divisibility of the subject, although the latter aids in determining the 
intention." (quoting Packard & Field, 73 S.C. at 6, 51 S.E. at 679)); Jaffe v. 
Gibbons, 290 S.C. 468, 473, 351 S.E.2d 343, 346 (Ct. App. 1986) (finding a party's 
act of initialing two paragraphs amounted to a signing and an acceptance of a 
counter offer relating to those two provisions). Thus, it is my view that the 
majority's decision to ignore the obvious divisibility of the multitude of contractual 
terms within paragraph fourteen contravenes state law. 
Moreover, "as a matter of substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration 
provision is severable from the remainder of the contract."  Buckeye Check 
Cashing, 546 U.S. at 445; see also 6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 11 ("Agreements for 
arbitration contained in a contract are treated as separable parts of the contract, so 
that the illegality of another part of the contract does not nullify an agreement to 
arbitrate." (citing Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics. Inc., 271 F.2d 402 
(2d Cir. 1959))). The United States Supreme Court has identified an arbitration 
provision as consisting of the "specific written provision to settle by arbitration a 
controversy." Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 72 (2010) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Stated differently, as a function of federal law, 
the relevant arbitration provision consists of only that portion of subparagraph (g) 
in which the parties agree to arbitrate any controversies.  Accordingly, even if state 
law justified the majority's finding that the entirety of paragraph fourteen 
constitutes the relevant arbitration provision (which it does not), such a finding 
would in any event be in conflict with, and therefore preempted by, federal 
substantive law identifying only a portion of subparagraph (g) as the arbitration 
agreement.  See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352 (finding state law rules that conflict 
with or "stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of [the FAA]" are preempted and invalidated); see also
DirecTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S.Ct. 463, 468–69 (2015) (citing U.S. Const. art. 
VI, cl. 2) (reaffirming the holding in Concepcion that state contract principles 
which conflict with the FAA are preempted). 
Because the Smiths fail to raise any challenge to the arbitration provision in 
subparagraph (g), I would find the Smiths' claims regarding unconscionability must 
be resolved in an arbitral forum, and I would reverse the court of appeals' decision.  
Cf. Munoz v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 343 S.C. 531, 542, 542 S.E.2d 360, 365 
(2001) ("An agreement providing for arbitration does not determine the remedy for 
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a breach of contract but only the forum in which the remedy for the breach is 
determined.").   
PLEICONES, C.J., concurs.
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CURETON, A.J.:  Coastal Federal Credit Union (CFCU) appeals a circuit court 
order granting summary judgment to Angel Brown and denying summary 
judgment to CFCU.  On appeal, CFCU argues the circuit court erred by (1) ruling 
the South Carolina Consumer Protection Code (SCCPC) and the Fair Debt 
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Collections Practices Act (FDCPA) apply to this case, (2) ruling the applicable 
statute of limitations was three years and granting Brown summary judgment on 
that basis, and (3) denying its motion for summary judgment.  We vacate the 
circuit court's order as to the first issue, reverse as to the second issue, find the 
third issue is not appealable, and remand for further proceedings.1 
I. FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 4, 2008, Brown entered into a retail installment sales contract with 
Johnny's Subaru Isuzu, LLC (the dealership), to purchase a vehicle.  Brown 
financed the purchase, and the contract gave the dealership a security interest in the 
vehicle. The contract also provided that the financed portion of Brown's purchase 
would accrue interest at an annual rate of 12.4 percent.  The dealership 
immediately assigned the contract to CFCU, and Brown's certificate of title listed 
CFCU as first lienholder.  Brown failed to make payments as required by the 
contract,2 and in October 2009, CFCU repossessed the vehicle.  On November 19, 
2009, CFCU sold the vehicle at auction, leaving an outstanding balance under the 
contract. On November 24, 2009, CFCU sent Brown a letter notifying her of the 
sale and resulting deficiency. 
On October 21, 2013, CFCU filed the summons and complaint in the current action 
seeking to collect Brown's debt.  The caption of the complaint stated the action was
for "debt collection," and the complaint alleged Brown "defaulted in making the 
regularly-scheduled monthly payments due under the [c]ontract."  The complaint 
further alleged CFCU repossessed and sold the vehicle "in accordance with the 
terms of the [c]ontract and applicable law," CFCU applied the proceeds "to the 
[c]ontract," and Brown owed an outstanding balance including interest and 
collection costs pursuant to the contract.  Brown answered, asserting a statute of 
limitations defense.  CFCU filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing the six-
year statute of limitations contained in Article 2 of the South Carolina Uniform
Commercial Code (SCUCC) 3 applied to the case, while neither the SCCPC nor the 
FDCPA were applicable. Brown filed a motion for summary judgment asserting 
1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR. 

2 Brown made her last payment in July 2009. 

3 Although the South Carolina Code refers to sections of the SCUCC as "Chapters" 

rather than "Articles," we use the term "Article" to maintain uniformity with 

language used in the Uniform Commercial Code and cited authority.
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the case was barred by the general three-year statute of limitations contained in 
section 15-3-530 of the South Carolina Code (2005). 
At a hearing on the motion, the circuit court engaged in the following exchange 
with CFCU: 
THE COURT: Did you sell the car? 
CFCU: We did Your Honor. 
COURT: And then you established a balance 
owing. 
CFCU: Correct, in deficiency only. 
. . . . 
COURT: You're now suing on the deficiency, 
and now you've got a situation [in 
which] you needed to do it sooner.  I 
grant [Brown's] motion for summary 
judgment. 
In its order disposing of the parties' motions, the circuit court found CFCU's action 
was one for the collection of a defaulted debt; therefore, the three-year statute of 
limitations applied and barred the action because it was initiated more than three 
years after CFCU repossessed the vehicle.  It also ruled, "The [SCCPC] and the 
[FDCPA] apply to this case." The circuit court granted Brown's motion for 
summary judgment and denied CFCU's motion.  This appeal followed. 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
 
1. Did the circuit court err by ruling the SCCPC and FDCPA apply to this 
case? 
 
2. Did the circuit court err by ruling the applicable statute of limitations was 
three years and granting Brown summary judgment on that basis? 
 
3. Did the circuit court err by denying CFCU's motion for summary judgment? 
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court applies the 
same standard used by the trial court."  Town of Summerville v. City of North 
Charleston, 378 S.C. 107, 109, 662 S.E.2d 40, 41 (2008).  "A grant of summary 
judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."  Id. at 109-10, 662 S.E.2d 
at 41. "Determining the proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and 
this [c]ourt reviews questions of law de novo."  Id. at 110, 662 S.E.2d at 41. 
IV. SCCPC & FDCPA 
CFCU argues the circuit court erred by ruling the SCCPC applies to this case 
because, as a federally-chartered credit union, it is specifically exempted from the 
SCCPC. Similarly, CFCU argues it is exempted from the FDCPA because it is 
attempting to collect money owed directly to it and therefore is not a "debt 
collector" under that act. Brown argues the circuit court's ruling on this issue was 
"merely incidental" and was not relied upon in reaching its ruling regarding the 
appropriate statute of limitations.  Brown further argues that because the circuit 
court granted no relief with respect to the SCCPC or the FDCPA, this court can 
offer no relief related to the ruling and should dismiss this portion of the appeal.  
We agree.
The circuit court did not rely on either the SCCPC or the FDCPA in reaching its 
decisions to grant summary judgment to Brown and deny summary judgment to 
CFCU. Because the ruling was unnecessary to the circuit court's disposition of the 
motions, it was improper.  We therefore vacate the ruling.  See Brading v. County 
of Georgetown, 327 S.C. 107, 112 n.3, 490 S.E.2d 4, 6 n.3 (1997) (vacating a
ruling related to an issue because the issue "was not before the referee and was 
unnecessary to his ruling").
V. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
CFCU argues the circuit court erred by granting Brown summary judgment on 
statute of limitations grounds because the contract at issue is an SCUCC Article 2 
contract for the sale of goods and the action is one for breach of the contract; 
therefore, the six-year statute of limitations in Article 2 controls.  See S.C. Code 
Ann. § 36-2-725(1) (2003) ("An action for breach of any contract for sale must be 
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commenced within six years after the cause of action has accrued.").4  Brown, on 
the other hand, argues CFCU's role in the sale was that of a financing agency and 
secured lender in a security transaction.  She further argues her alleged debt "arose 
from a deficiency" after CFCU repossessed and sold the vehicle, and CFCU's
actions were taken pursuant to SCUCC Article 9 to collect a debt arising out of its 
security interest in the vehicle.  Accordingly, Brown argues this action is not one 
for breach of a sales contract under Article 2, and because Article 9 does not 
contain a statute of limitations, CFCU's claim is governed by the general three-year 
statute of limitations in section 15-3-530.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530(1) 
(2005) (providing a three-year statute of limitations for "an action upon a contract, 
obligation, or liability, express or implied").  CFCU rejects Brown's assertion that 
the action was transformed into one solely for debt collection because CFCU 
repossessed and sold the vehicle.  Rather, CFCU argues its complaint set forth that 
Brown breached the contract and CFCU is attempting to enforce the contractual 
payment obligations through this action. 
This issue—whether Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) applies to 
an action for the recovery of a deficiency following the repossession and sale of 
collateral by a secured creditor who is also a party to the sales contract creating the 
security interest in the collateral—is one of first impression in South Carolina.  
Additionally, there is a split of authority on this issue nationally.  See David J. 
Marchitelli, Annotation, Causes of Action Governed by Limitations Period in UCC 
§ 2-725, 49 A.L.R. 5th 1 (1997) (listing cases applying the UCC statute of 
limitations in section 15(a) of the annotation, and cases applying a non-UCC 
statute of limitations in section 15(b)); Sonja A. Soehnel, Annotation, What 
Constitutes a Transaction, a Contract for Sale, or a Sale Within the Scope of UCC 
Article 2, 4 A.L.R. 4th 85 (1981) (listing cases applying Article 2 to mixed sale-
security contract actions in section 19(a) of the annotation, and cases declining to 
apply Article 2 in section 19(b)). 
4 Article 2 does exempt from its scope transactions "intended to operate only as a 
security transaction." S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2-102 (2003) (emphasis added).  
However, the transaction between Brown and the dealership was a mixed 
transaction involving both a sale of goods and a security agreement.  Accordingly, 
it did not operate only as a security transaction and was not exempted from Article 
2's scope. 
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The majority of jurisdictions applies Article 2 to such actions, reasoning "a 
deficiency suit is more closely related to the sales aspect of a combination sale and 
security interest than to the security aspect."  Richard H. Nowka, The Secured 
Party Fiddles While the Article 2 Statute of Limitations Clock Ticks-Why the 
Article 2 Statute of Limitations Should Not Apply to Deficiency Actions, 7 Fla. St. 
U. Bus. Rev. 1, 5 (2008); id. at 39 (recognizing "the tally of cases deciding the 
issue is greatly in favor of applying Article 2").  Conversely, the minority of 
jurisdictions reasons that an action to recover a deficiency is more closely related 
to the security aspect of the transaction, which is governed by UCC Article 9, and 
chooses not to apply Article 2. See, e.g., N.C. Nat'l Bank v. Holshouser, 247 
S.E.2d 645, 647 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978) (ruling Article 2 "inapplicable to this 
transaction beyond its pure sales aspects, and that Article 9 is paramount in 
reference to the security aspects of the transaction").  We believe the majority's
reasoning is more persuasive and adopt it here.  See, e.g., Worrel v. Farmers Bank 
of Del., 430 A.2d 469, 471 (Del. 1981) ("We agree . . . that Article 2, the sales 
article of the Uniform Commercial Code . . . , controlled the contractual rights of 
the parties . . . ."); Barnes v. Cmty. Trust Bank, 121 S.W.3d 520, 524 (Ky. Ct. App. 
2003) ("We agree with the courts of the other states . . . that while this case may be 
viewed as involving a hybrid contract, it deals essentially with a contract for the 
sale of a good. As such, it falls squarely within Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, and should be governed by the limitations period contained in 
that article."); Assocs. Disc. Corp. v. Palmer, 219 A.2d 858, 861 (N.J. 1966) 
("[W]e think [the view that an action for a deficiency is not governed by Article 2 
because it is incident to the security arrangement between the parties rather than 
the sales aspect of the agreement] mistakes the true character of a deficiency suit.  
Such a suit is nothing but a simple [i]n personam action for that part of the sales 
price which remains unpaid after the seller has exhausted his rights under Article 9 
by selling the collateral; it is an action to enforce the obligation of the buyer to pay 
the full sale price to the seller, an obligation which is an essential element of all 
sales and which exists whether or not the sale is accompanied by a security 
arrangement."); First Nat'l Bank in Albuquerque v. Chase, 887 P.2d 1250, 1252 
(N.M. 1994) ("a deficiency action is essentially an action for the price and is, 
therefore, part of the general sales aspect of the agreement").
Admittedly, CFCU exercised its right to repossess the vehicle under SCUCC 
Article 9. See S.C. Code Ann. § 36-9-609 (2003) (allowing repossession of 
collateral after default); S.C. Code Ann. § 36-9-610(a) (2003) (allowing the sale of 
collateral after default); S.C. Code Ann. § 36-9-615(d) (2003) (holding the obligor 
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liable for any deficiency following sale).  However, as assignee to the sales 
contract, CFCU gained the dealership's rights thereunder, including the right to sue
Brown for a breach of the contract.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2-210 (2) (2003) 
("Unless otherwise agreed[,] all rights of either seller or buyer can be assigned 
except where the assignment would materially change the duty of the other party, 
or increase materially the burden or risk imposed on him by his contract, or impair 
materially his chance of obtaining return performance."); Twelfth RMA Partners, 
L.P. v. Nat'l Safe Corp., 335 S.C. 635, 639, 518 S.E.2d 44, 46 (Ct. App. 1999) ("In 
South Carolina, it is well established that an 'assignee . . . stands in the shoes of its 
assignor . . . .'" (quoting Singletary v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 316 S.C. 199, 201, 
447 S.E.2d 869, 870 (Ct. App. 1994)); id. at 640, 518 S.E.2d at 46 ("When a 
contract is assigned, the assignee should have all the same rights and privileges, 
including the right to sue on the contract, as the assignor."); First Nat'l Bank in 
Albuquerque, 887 P.2d at 1252 ("The fact that the [automobile installment sales 
contract and security agreement] was later assigned . . . does not change the nature 
of the agreement."). 
In our view, CFCU is entitled to exercise its rights under both Articles 2 and 9 
simultaneously, so long as it does not obtain double recovery, and repossessing and 
selling the vehicle did not extinguish CFCU's rights under the sales contract, 
including the right to recover interest from Brown at the agreed-upon rate and 
collection costs. See S.C. Code Ann. § 36-9-601(a) (2003) ("After default, a 
secured party has the rights provided in this part and, except as otherwise provided 
in [s]ection 36-9-602, those provided by agreement of the parties." (emphasis 
added)); S.C. Code Ann. § 36-9-602 (2003) (mandating that certain statutory 
provision in Article 9 may not be waived or varied); Andrews v. von Elten & 
Walker, Inc., 315 S.C. 199, 202, 432 S.E.2d 500, 502 (Ct. App. 1993) (ruling "the 
UCC does not prohibit a secured party in possession of collateral from proceeding 
judicially on a guaranty"). Had the transaction between Brown and the dealership 
been simply a contract for the sale of goods unaccompanied by the creation of a 
security agreement, there is no question that CFCU, as the dealership's assignee, 
would be entitled to sue Brown for a breach of the contract, and the applicable 
statute of limitations would be that of SCUCC Article 2.  We can discern no reason 
why this right should be taken away merely because a security interest in the 
vehicle was created concomitantly with its sale. 
Here, although CFCU captioned its complaint as a "debt collection" action, it 
alleged Brown defaulted under the contract, CFCU repossessed and sold the 
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vehicle "in accordance with the terms of the [c]ontract and applicable law," CFCU 
applied the proceeds "to the [c]ontract," and Brown owed an outstanding balance 
that included interest and collection costs pursuant to the contract.  Accordingly, 
CFCU's action relates to the sales contract and is governed by SCUCC Article 2.  
Because CFCU's action was filed within the six-year statute of limitations in 
section 36-2-725, we reverse the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to 
Brown. 
VI. DENIAL OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
CFCU argues the circuit court erred by denying its motion for summary judgment 
on the merits because there was no genuine issue of material fact surrounding 
Brown's breach of contract and resulting indebtedness and CFCU was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  CFCU further argues that while a denial of summary 
judgment is generally not appealable, this denial is appealable because it 
accompanies the circuit court's appealable grant of summary judgment to Brown.  
We find this issue is not appealable. See Ballenger v. Bowen, 313 S.C. 476, 476, 
443 S.E.2d 379, 380 (1994) ("This [c]ourt has repeatedly held that the denial of 
summary judgment is not directly appealable."); id. at 477, 443 S.E.2d at 380 
("The denial of summary judgment does not establish the law of the case, and the 
issues raised in the motion may be raised again later in the proceedings by a 
motion to reconsider the summary judgment motion or by a motion for a directed 
verdict."); id. ("In short, the denial of summary judgment does not finally
determine anything about the merits of the case and does not have the effect of 
striking any defense since that defense may be raised again later in the 
proceedings."). 
VII. CONCLUSION 
We reverse the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to Brown, vacate its 
ruling regarding the SCCPC and FDCPA, and remand for further proceedings.
VACATED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. 
THOMAS, J., concurs. 
SHORT, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:  I concur with the 
majority in its disposition of the first and third issues.  As to the second issue, I 
respectfully dissent. 
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The second issue in this case is whether the applicable statute of limitations is the 
statute of limitations in Article 2 (governing the sale of goods) or the statute of 
limitations for the default on a security interest (governed by general statutes 
because Article 9 does not contain its own statute of limitations).  Considering the 
applicable statute of limitations under facts similar to those presented in this case, 
the Court of Appeals of North Carolina in North Carolina National Bank v. 
Holshouser, 247 S.E.2d 645, 647 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978), found the Article 2 statute 
of limitations did not apply.  The court found Article 2 would apply to the sales 
aspects of such a transaction and Article 9 would apply to the security aspects of 
the transaction. Id.  Because Article 9 contains no statute of limitations, the court 
in Holshouser looked to other statutes of limitations in North Carolina.  Id.
I recognize many courts have applied the Article 2 statute of limitations to an 
action on a secured transaction similar to this action.  See Richard H. Nowka, The 
Secured Party Fiddles While the Article 2 Statute of Limitations Clock Ticks - Why 
the Article 2 Statute of Limitations Should Not Apply to Deficiency Actions, 7 Fla. 
St. U. Bus. Rev. 1, 39-40 (2008) (explaining many courts have ignored the Official 
Comments to Article 2 and summarily cited Associates Discount Corp. v. Palmer, 
219 A.2d 858 (N.J. 1966) in finding Article 2 applies under similar facts); id. at 2 
n.4 (listing cases that have applied the Article 2 statute of limitations); 
DaimlerChrysler Servs. N. Am., LLC v. Ouimette, 830 A.2d 38, 42 (Vt. 2003) 
(citing multiple jurisdictions applying the Article 2 statute of limitations to a suit 
for default on a motor vehicle retail installment sales contract).  However, I agree 
with the rationale of the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Holshouser and find 
the circuit court did not err when it found the three-year statute of limitations 
applied in this case. 
The sales transaction between Brown and Johnny's Subaru Isuzu, LLC (Johnny's) 
was for the sale of goods, namely the vehicle.  Johnny's assigned the Retail 
Installment Sale Contract (the Contract) to CFCU.  The Contract provided the 
financing terms and created a security interest.  As a transaction for the sale of 
goods, CFCU correctly contends the SCUCC applied to the sale of the vehicle.  
See S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2-102 (2003) ("Chapter [2 of the SCUCC] applies to 
transactions in goods; it does not apply to any transaction . . . intended to operate 
only as a security transaction . . . .").  However, in my view, CFCU's cause of 
action does not arise from a breach of the sales contract under the SCUCC; rather, 
it is a debt collection action on the security interest, not arising under the SCUCC.  
See BancOhio Nat'l Bank v. Freeland, 468 N.E.2d 941, 944 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) 
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(finding an action based on the note secured by a vehicle was not governed by 
Article 2 where the financer was not the seller of the vehicle); see also Gray v. 
Suttell & Assocs., 123 F. Supp. 3d 1283, 1289-90 (E.D. Wash. 2015) 
(distinguishing between a hybrid agreement, which constituted both a contract for 
sale and a secured transaction and was subject to Article 2, and a financing 
agreement separate from the sale of goods, which was not subject to Article 2); 
S.C. Code Ann. § 36-1-201(35) (Supp. 2015) ("'Security interest' means an interest 
in personal property or fixtures, which secures payment or performance of an 
obligation."). 
Based on the analysis in Holshouser, I would find the circuit court properly 
granted Brown's motion for summary judgment.  See McMaster v. Dewitt, 411 S.C. 
138, 143, 767 S.E.2d 451, 453 (Ct. App. 2014) ("Summary judgment is appropriate 
when a plaintiff does not commence an action within the applicable statute of 
limitations."). Accordingly, I would affirm the second issue. 
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MCDONALD, J.: In this action arising from an automobile accident, Jonetha 
Singleton appeals, arguing the circuit court erred in directing a verdict that she was 
negligent as a matter of law under section 56-5-2770(A) of the South Carolina 
Code (2006) in turning left behind another vehicle stopped behind a stopped school 
bus. We reverse. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
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On October 6, 2010, Singleton was involved in an automobile accident in Beaufort 
County. Singleton was making a left turn into her mother's driveway when 
Starshaka Cuthbert's vehicle, approaching from the oncoming direction, continued 
past a stopped school bus and struck her.  Just before Singleton made her left turn, 
she was stopped one car behind the stopped bus.  Although the school bus's caution 
lights were activated, Cuthbert did not stop for the school bus and hit Singleton's 
car on the right side. 
Singleton filed a complaint on November 10, 2011, seeking compensatory and 
punitive damages.  Cuthbert answered, asserting comparative negligence as a 
defense. During the trial on May 6, 2013, Cuthbert moved for directed verdict, 
asserting Singleton violated section 56-5-2770(A) by turning left behind the 
vehicle stopped behind the school bus.  Cuthbert contended Singleton was 
negligent as a matter of law because Singleton's own testimony established the 
school bus's flashing red lights were activated, the bus was stopped, she came to a 
stop, and then she proceeded to make her left turn while the bus was still stopped.  
Singleton countered that no evidence established she was "meeting or overtaking" 
the bus as referenced in section 56-5-2770(A).   
The circuit court granted Cuthbert's motion for directed verdict, determining 
Singleton was negligent in violating section 56-5-2770(A) because she made the 
left turn without waiting for the school bus to deactivate its warning lights or 
resume moving. The issues of Cuthbert's negligence, the comparative negligence 
of each party, and causation were submitted to the jury. 
The jury returned a verdict for Cuthbert.  Singleton moved for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and a new trial.  The circuit court denied both 
motions. 
ISSUE 
Did the circuit court err in directing a verdict that Singleton was negligent as a 
matter of law under section 56-5-2770(A) of the South Carolina Code by turning 
left behind a vehicle stopped behind a stopped school bus? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"In ruling on a motion for a directed verdict . . . , the trial court must view the 
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evidence and the inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the party opposing the motions."  McNaughton v. Charleston 
Charter Sch. for Math & Sci., Inc., 411 S.C. 249, 259, 768 S.E.2d 389, 395 (2015).
The circuit court must deny the motion "when the evidence yields more than one 
inference or its inference is in doubt." Id.  "This Court will reverse the trial court 
only when there is no evidence to support the trial court's ruling."  Id.
LAW AND ANALYSIS 
Singleton argues the trial court erred in directing a verdict that she was negligent as 
a matter of law under section 56-5-2770(A) of the South Carolina Code in turning 
left behind a vehicle stopped behind a stopped school bus.  We agree. 
Section 56-5-2770(A) provides:
The driver of a vehicle meeting or overtaking from either 
direction a school bus stopped on a highway or private 
road must stop before reaching the bus where there are in 
operation on the bus flashing red lights specified in State 
Department of Education Regulations and Specifications 
Pertaining to School Buses, and the driver must not 
proceed until the bus resumes motion or the flashing red 
lights are no longer actuated.   
S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2770(A) (2006). 
The circuit court granted Cuthbert's motion for directed verdict, finding Singleton 
was negligent as a matter of law for admittedly turning left behind the vehicle 
stopped behind a bus with flashing caution lights. Singleton admitted the school 
bus's flashing red lights were on, the bus was stopped, she came to a stop, and then 
she proceeded to turn left into the driveway while the bus was still stopped.  She 
assigns error, however, to the circuit court's interpretation of "meeting and 
overtaking" under section 56-5-2770(A). 
Singleton asserts the trial court erred in interpreting the meaning of either the word 
"meeting" or the word "overtaking" as set forth in section 56-5-2770(A).  Singleton 
asserts she was not "meeting" the bus because she was more than one vehicle 
behind the bus and she was traveling from behind the bus.  Therefore, in order for 
section 56-5-2770(A) to apply, the court must have determined she was
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"overtaking" the bus. However, because Singleton stopped and turned before she 
reached the bus, she did not "overtake" the bus.  Singleton asserts the pivotal 
question is whether turning left behind a vehicle behind a stopped school bus 
constitutes overtaking a school bus as a matter of law.   
"The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent 
of the legislature." Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 
(2000). "The Court will give words their plain and ordinary meaning, and will not 
resort to a subtle or forced construction that would limit or expand the statute's 
operation."  Harris v. Anderson Cty. Sheriff's Office, 381 S.C. 357, 362, 673 S.E.2d 
423, 425 (2009). "Where the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and 
conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not 
needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning."  Hodges, 341 S.C. 
at 85, 533 S.E.2d at 581.
Singleton argues there is no ambiguity in the word "overtaking" and asserts the 
word "overtake" means "catch up with and pass by."  She cites Fisher v. J. H. 
Sheridan Co., 182 S.C. 316, 189 S.E. 356 (1936) in support of her argument.
Fisher involved an act from 1934, which provided: 
[A]ll motor vehicles traveling upon the public highways 
of this State are required to come to a full and complete 
stop before passing any school bus which has stopped for 
the purpose of taking on and discharging school children 
and shall remain stopped until said children are taken on 
or discharged and until such school bus has moved on. 
182 S.C. at 320–21, 189 S.E. at 358 (emphasis added).  Our supreme court held the 
act required an automobile to stop regardless of which way it is traveling, and the 
word "passing" meant "going by" regardless of whether the automobile and bus are 
traveling in same direction.  Id.
Similarly, the common simple definitions of "overtake" include "to move up and 
past (someone or something that is in front of you) by moving faster" and "to go 
past another vehicle that is moving more slowly in the same direction."  Overtake 
Definition, MERRIAM–WEBSTER.COM, http://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
overtake (last visited February 19, 2016).  The first full definition of "overtake" 
includes the phrases "to catch up with" and "to catch up with and pass by."  See 
e.g., Hughes v. W. Carolina Reg'l Sewer Auth., 386 S.C. 641, 648, 689 S.E.2d 638, 
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643 (Ct. App. 2009) (considering common definitions and their uses within the 
rules of statutory construction). 
In the court's charge to the jury, the court stated: 
I ruled that [Singleton] violated that statute . . . because 
she was in close proximity to the bus, under her 
testimony.  If the bus had stopped and traffic had backed 
up for two miles, you know, you could turn.  It's only 
when you get close enough that a child might be in 
danger that you couldn't . . . turn.   
Singleton argues the court's ruling is not supported by Fisher or any other case law 
because she was not passing, seeking to pass, or catching up to the school bus.  The 
circuit court's own instructions demonstrate it expanded the operation of section 
56-5-2770(A) to encompass not only "meeting or overtaking" vehicles, but also 
those "in close proximity to" a school bus.  While this would certainly be 
reasonable behavior for a driver (and perhaps relevant to the consideration of due 
care), it is not mandated by the plain language of section 56-5-2770(A).  Thus, to 
the extent this statute is even applicable to the current situation, whether Singleton 
was negligent is a factual issue that should have been determined by the jury.   
CONCLUSION 
Because Singleton was neither "meeting or overtaking" a stopped school bus at the 
time of this accident, the circuit court erred in directing a verdict that she was 
negligent as a matter of law under section 56-5-2770(A).  Accordingly, we reverse 
the circuit court's ruling and remand the matter for a new trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
LOCKEMY, C.J., concurs. 
SHORT, J.:  I respectfully dissent. I find the language of the statute to be
unambiguous in that the driver of a vehicle meeting or overtaking from either 
direction a school bus stopped on a highway or private road must stop before 
reaching the bus where there are in operation on the bus flashing red lights and the 
driver must not proceed until the bus resumes motion or the flashing red lights are 
no longer actuated. Singleton's testimony was that when she approached the 
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school bus from behind, the bus' flashing red lights were activated and the bus was 
stopped. She came to a stop behind the school bus, but she turned left while the 
bus was still stopped. By her own testimony and the clear language of the statute, I 
find she was in violation and the evidence supports the trial court's ruling. 
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GEATHERS, J.: Ashley Noojin, Ph.D. (Mother) appeals the family court's order 
finding her in contempt and requiring her to pay Frank Noojin's, M.D. (Father) 
attorney's fees and  costs.  She argues  the  family court  erred  in (1) finding she 
willfully violated a court order; (2) excluding an exhibit; (3) limiting cross-
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examination of an expert witness; and (4) ordering her to pay Father's attorney's
fees and costs and failing to award her attorney's fees and costs.  We affirm. 
FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Father and Mother married in 1993 and divorced on April 8, 2011. Father is 
a surgeon, and Mother is a licensed clinical psychologist. Two children (Son and 
Daughter, collectively Children)1 were born of the marriage.
Prior to the final divorce hearing, the couple reached a child custody 
agreement wherein they shared joint custody, with Mother as the primary custodial
parent and Father having frequent "nights of contact and visitation with the 
children." The agreement outlined a "phase-in" visitation schedule from December
18, 2010, until February 19, 2011, with the regular schedule to begin on March 1, 
2011. The regular schedule allotted visitation every other weekend and one 
evening dinner on the alternate weeks. The agreement provided Children could 
extend (1) the weekends to include Thursday or Sunday night when Friday or 
Monday was a holiday and (2) the weeknight dinner to an overnight visit. The 
agreement outlined specific visitation schedules for holidays, birthdays, summer 
vacations, and spring break. 
Additionally, the agreement provided:
The visitation provided to Father in this Agreement shall
take into consideration each child's wishes and desires in 
this regard, however, the children's wishes shall not be 
controlling unless otherwise specifically provided in this 
Agreement. . . . The parties agree to engage in family 
counseling with a therapist mutually agreeable to the 
parties. They shall attend family counseling once or 
twice per month and Father will use his weekday time 
with the children for this counseling, if necessary. 
(emphasis added).  In addition to the visitation schedule, the agreement provided:  
1 Daughter was born in 1998 and Son was born in 2000. They were twelve and 
ten, respectively, at the time of the custody agreement in 2010 and fifteen and  
thirteen at the time of the contempt hearing in 2013.   
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Each party shall exert every reasonable effort to maintain 
free access and unhampered contact between the children
and each of the parties and to foster a feeling of 
affections between the children and the other party. 
Neither party shall do anything which may estrange the  
children from the other party or  injure the children's 
opinion as to his/her mother or father or which may 
hamper the free and natural development of  the  
children's love and respect for the other party. 
(emphases added). The parties also agreed to (1) refrain from making disparaging 
remarks about the other parent in the presence of Children and discourage third 
parties from doing so; (2) consult each other regarding Children's education, 
illness, health, welfare, and "other matters of similar importance affecting" 
Children; and (3) refrain from having physical or verbal confrontations or allowing 
another to do so in the presence of Children. On December 15, 2010, the family 
court approved the agreement and incorporated it into the final decree of divorce 
(the divorce order).
In February 2013, Father filed a complaint for contempt and the parties 
proceeded to a three-day contempt hearing.2 At the hearing, Father testified that 
after the standard visitation began on March 1, 2011, he did not receive regular 
visits. He outlined the limited visitation he received from 2011 to 2013.  
Specifically, in 2011,3 according to Father, he received one of the twenty dinners; 
one full weekend and four partial weekends of the twenty weekends; none of the
five days allotted for spring break; one of the two days allotted for Father's Day; 
none of the five days allotted for Thanksgiving; and two of the ten days allotted for 
Christmas. In 2012, Father received one of the twenty-three dinners; two 
weekends of the twenty-five weekends; none of the three days for spring break; 
five hours of the two days allotted for Father's Day; and two days of the eight days 
allotted for Christmas. The contempt hearing began on April 30, 2013, and from 
2 The hearing took place on April 30, August 8, and September 23, 2013.   
3 The majority of the visits were with Son only as Daughter ceased participating in 
dinner and weekend visitation in 2011.
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January to April 2013, Father received one of the eight dinners, none of the eight 
weekends, and none of the three days allotted for spring break.4    
 
Following the hearing, the family court found Mother in contempt for failure 
to comply with the divorce order and ordered her to pay Father $41,375.84 in 
attorney's fees and costs. This appeal followed. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the family court err in finding Mother in contempt? 
 
2. Did the family court err in excluding a letter Father wrote to Children on 
December 13, 2010? 
 
3. Did the family court err in limiting cross-examination of a witness? 
 
4. Did the family court err in awarding attorney's fees and costs? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW  
"In appeals from the family court, [appellate courts] review[] factual and 
legal issues de novo."  Simmons v. Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414, 709 S.E.2d 666, 
667 (2011).  "[W]hile retaining the authority to make our own findings of fact, we 
recognize the superior position of the family court judge in making credibility 
determinations."  Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 392, 709 S.E.2d 650, 655 (2011).  
"Stated differently, de novo review neither relieves an appellant of demonstrating 
error nor requires us to ignore the findings of the family court."  Id. at 388-89, 709 
S.E.2d at 654 (emphasis removed).  Further, a finding of contempt rests within the 
sound discretion of the family court.  DiMarco v. DiMarco, 393 S.C. 604, 607, 713 
S.E.2d 631, 633 (2011).  "Such a finding should not be disturbed on appeal unless 
it is unsupported by the evidence or the judge has abused his discretion."  Id. 
 
                                        
  
 
 
  
4 We are not persuaded by Mother's argument that the family court erred in its 
findings of fact with respect to the amount of visitation Father actually received.  
Father admitted he spent time with Son on a few instances that were not a weekend
or dinner visit. Whether Father failed to include in his visitation chart a few 
occasions in which he visited with Children would not change the ultimate
disposition of this case. 
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LAW/ANALYSIS  

I. Willful Contempt 

Mother raises several grounds as to how the family court erred in its finding 
of contempt. We have reduced those arguments to their analytical essence. 
At the outset, we note that because the family court was in a better position 
to assess the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, we defer to the family 
court as to any alleged error regarding the specific factual findings.  After 
observing these parties over the course of a three-day hearing, the family court was 
in a better position to evaluate their credibility and assign comparative weight to 
their testimony.  See S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Mary C., 396 S.C. 15, 26, 720 
S.E.2d 503, 509 (Ct. App. 2011) (holding it is proper to defer to the family court 
even if conflicting evidence is presented on appeal as long as ample evidence in 
the record supports the family court's findings and conclusions); Pinckney v. 
Warren, 344 S.C. 382, 387-88, 544 S.E.2d 620, 623 (2001) (holding the appellant 
carries the burden of demonstrating error in the family court's findings of fact); 
Lewis, 392 S.C. at 388-89, 709 S.E.2d at 654 (stating the appellate court generally 
defers to the factual findings of the family court regarding credibility because the 
family court is in a better position to observe the witness and his or her demeanor). 
 
Within that framework, we find the record supports the family court finding 
Mother in contempt for her willful disobedience of the divorce order.  "Contempt 
is a consequence of the willful disobedience of a court order."  Tirado v. Tirado, 
339 S.C. 649, 654, 530 S.E.2d 128, 131 (Ct. App. 2000).  "A willful act is one 
'done voluntarily and intentionally with the specific intent . . . to fail to do 
something the law requires to be done . . . .'"  Id. (alterations by court) (quoting 
Spartanburg Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Padgett, 296 S.C. 79, 82-83, 370 S.E.2d 
872, 874 (1988)).  A finding of contempt, therefore, must be reflected in a record 
that is "clear and specific as to the acts or conduct upon which such finding is 
based."  Curlee v. Howle, 277 S.C. 377, 382, 287 S.E.2d 915, 918 (1982).  
"Contempt is an extreme measure; this power vested in a court is not lightly 
asserted."  Bigham v. Bigham, 264 S.C. 101, 104, 212 S.E.2d 594, 596 (1975).  
"Prior to invoking this power, the court must necessarily consider the ability of the 
defendant to comply with the order."  Id.  "A party seeking a contempt finding for 
violation of a court order must show the order's existence and facts establishing the 
other party did not comply with the order."  Abate v. Abate, 377 S.C. 548, 553, 660 
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S.E.2d 515, 518 (Ct. App. 2008). "Civil contempt must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence." DiMarco, 393 S.C. at 607, 713 S.E.2d at 633. 
When considered in the aggregate, Mother's actions and her failure to act
when necessary demonstrated a willful violation of the divorce order.  The facts of
this case are similar to Eaddy v. Oliver, 345 S.C. 39, 42, 545 S.E.2d 830, 832 (Ct. 
App. 2001), in which a father argued the family court erred in failing to find a
mother in contempt for her violation of a visitation order. During the family court 
hearing in Eaddy, the father testified to ongoing problems with the mother in 
arranging visitation and stated there had been periods of several months when he 
did not see the child. Id. at 43, 545 S.E.2d at 832. He stated plans were made for 
the child without his knowledge and the child went on other social outings instead 
of visiting him as provided in the order. Id. The father testified regarding the
mother's refusal to cooperate or keep him informed about the child. Id. at 43, 545 
S.E.2d at 833. He stated he had made several attempts to discuss his lack of 
visitation with the mother but the mother "responded by telling him [the child] did 
not want to see him, hanging up the phone, and refusing to answer letters from his 
attorney." Id. This court held the family court erred in failing to hold the mother 
in contempt because the father's testimony constituted a prima facie showing of 
contempt and the mother did not produce evidence tending to establish a defense or 
explanation for failing to comply with the family court order. Id.  "Once the  
movant makes a prima facie showing by pleading an order and demonstrating 
noncompliance, 'the burden shifts to the respondent to establish his defense and 
inability to comply.'" Id. at 42, 545 S.E.2d at 832 (quoting Henderson v. 
Henderson, 298 S.C. 190, 197, 379 S.E.2d 125, 129 (1989)).
Here, Mother asserts her failure to comply with the divorce order resulted
from Father's agreement to not require Children to visit him against their wishes.  
She argues she did not introduce the concept of "forced visitation," as the family 
court found; however, if she did, that concept was adhered to by Father and the
family's therapist. Therefore, according to Mother, her "alteration of the visitation 
schedule" was not done with bad purpose and was not a willful disobedience of the
court order. We disagree. 
Part of Mother's contemptuous behavior centers on her introduction and
implementation of the concept of "forced" visitation as a negative notion, failure to
facilitate visitation, and acquiescence in Children's refusal to participate in 
visitation. For a proper understanding of this case, an extensive presentation of the 
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facts is necessary. Although the record includes a large volume of email 
exchanges between Mother and Father, a few particularly poignant exchanges are
addressed below. 
For example, on December 15, 2010—the day the family court approved the 
custody agreement—Mother emailed Father, stating in pertinent part:  
pushing [Children] beyond where they feel comfortable 
will do damage and hurt all of you in the long run[.] I
know we set a schedule but this is your chance to show 
them the kind of dad that you want to be. Let them ask 
you for more time. . . . They do not want a schedule even
though you do. . . .  My allegiance is with them and only 
with you as well if you listen to them. 
(emphasis added). On March 15, 2011, after requests from Father for visitation, 
Mother wrote Father, explaining "I will never support forcing time with you
against their will. If you make that choice, you are on your own. I was offering 
my help if you were willing to listen to their thoughts and feelings." (emphases 
added). On March 27, 2011, Mother sent Father a lengthy email detailing her  
tumultuous relationship with her own father that developed after she was "forced"
to visit with him following her parents' divorce. She explained she told Children
about the pain the visitations caused and they asked "will [Father] do to us what 
your dad did to you." She stated she "assured them that [Father] would never do 
the things to them that" her father did to her, i.e., require Children to visit him 
against their wishes. 
In August 2011, Mother wrote Father scolding him for calling Daughter to 
ask her about her eighth-grade speech, stating Daughter was "very upset" by the 
call and she "needs to be prepared" if Father is going to contact her. On September 
5, 2011, Mother wrote Father stating she encouraged Son to see Father; however, 
"The only thing [she did] not do is force him. . . . Forcing him is not the answer."
(emphasis added). On May 8, 2012, apparently irritated with Mother, Father wrote 
an email expressing his frustration that two years had passed in which Children had 
minimal contact with Father.  Father stated the following: 
It seems that the visitation part of the agreement is 
ignored . . . . [Y]ou either do not tell me about school 
functions or dismiss me from them when you don't want 
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me there. . . .  [Y]ou never answer the phone and you do 
not have the kids return them. . . .  I can't believe you 
allow your daughter to have a cell phone block so her 
own father who loves her and cannot communicate with 
her. . . . You rarely inform me of anything going on with
my daughter. I have to find out from other people what 
my children are doing. . . .  As their mother[,] you control 
most of what they do and who they associate with and,
after informing them that their father was seeking 
"forced" visitation, informed them that that was wrong 
and that it didn't work for you. You overly interjected 
your own personal experience into my relationship with 
my kids!  Now, knowing their father is optional.
On May 23, 2012, after Father requested to schedule visitations with Son,  
Mother wrote Father stating Son did not want Mother to plan a visitation schedule 
for him, explaining Son was busy with "huge tests" and "he will be ready to have 
some conversations about the summer once school gets out." Father asked Mother 
to assist Son in creating a schedule "since he's only 12," but Mother responded, "If 
he wanted me to help him plan, I would be happy to."   
In emails exchanged between August 20 and 30, 2013—after the second day 
of the three-day contempt hearing—Mother expressed her concern with Father's 
request for dinner with the children; however, she stated she would "comply with 
the court orders and [Father's] request." Nevertheless, in additional emails, she 
skirted visitation requests. Further, she stated, "You [do not] seem to even care 
what your plan is doing to them."  Father responded as follows:
Of course I am concerned. Maybe you should consider 
allaying their fears about time with their Dad. Did you 
ever consider that I might have something to contribute 
to their emotional development, their future relationships,
their education, and more? . . .  Ostracizing and 
alienating me (and having the children participate in this 
with your approval) is not allowing any of us to heal. 
A few days later, in September 2013, in an attempt to thwart another 
visitation request, Mother stated, "As you are well aware, the court-approved 
agreement provided that visitation takes into account the children['s] wishes and 
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should include therapy."5 She went on to state Children were "distraught" and 
would run away if "forced to visit with" Father.   
In addition to these emails, Jennifer Savitz-Smith, the family's therapist and 
an expert in counseling children and family counseling, testified that although 
Mother and Children used the term "forced" visitation, the term was not a part of 
her lexicon and Father did not introduce the term to her. Moreover, when asked 
her expert opinion regarding Mother's emails and behaviors, Allison Foster, Ph.D., 
an expert in clinical psychology, testified she would be concerned about Mother's 
"circumnavigation" of the court order. 
Accordingly, we find the record reveals Mother's unwillingness to comply
with the court order from the day the family court approved the custody agreement.
See Tirado, 339 S.C. at 654, 530 S.E.2d at 131 ("Contempt is a consequence of the 
willful disobedience of a court order."). The evidence demonstrates Mother coined 
5 Despite Mother's argument on appeal, as we read the plain language of the 
agreement, Father's visitation rights were not contingent upon Children's wishes or
the family attending therapy. See Bogan v. Bogan, 298 S.C. 139, 142, 378 S.E.2d 
606, 608 (Ct. App. 1989) ("The language used in a decree must be given its 
ordinary and commonly accepted meaning."); id. ("Where an instrument evidences
care in its preparation, it will be presumed its words were employed deliberately 
and with intention."); see also Hawkins v. Mullins, 359 S.C. 497, 503, 597 S.E.2d 
897, 900 (Ct. App. 2004) (reversing the family court's failure to find a mother in 
contempt for failing to produce the child for summer visitation, finding the
mother's claims regarding misunderstanding the family court's orders were 
"disingenuous" and the mother had a history of interfering with the father's  
visitations); cf. Ward v. Washington, 406 S.C. 249, 255, 750 S.E.2d 105, 109 (Ct.
App. 2013) (holding evidence supported finding Mother could have reasonably 
misinterpreted the order; therefore, her actions of withholding visitation were not 
willful). Moreover, as to any alleged inconsistencies in the remedial provisions of 
the contempt order, there can be little doubt that the family court did not intend for 
future therapy to be used as a precondition or tool to prohibit Father's visitation 
with either child. The family court explicitly stated: "this family needs therapy
with . . . whomever can be agreed upon. However, I specifically find that  such  
therapy shall not be used as a tool or pre-condition to prohibit Plaintiff-Father
from the regular parenting time and contact with the children afforded him under 
the terms of the court-approved Custody Agreement."  (emphasis added).   
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the term "forced visitation," alienated Father by imparting to Children scheduling 
visitation was inappropriate, refused  to set a schedule, and  sought Children's 
guidance any time Father sought to enforce the custody agreement. Not only did 
Mother fail to require Children to visit with Father, she imparted to Children the 
idea that they did not have to visit with Father if they did not want to. We find 
Mother's actions in this regard constituted a willful disobedience of the divorce 
order. See Watson v. Poole, 329 S.C. 232, 239, 495 S.E.2d 236, 240 (Ct. App. 
1997) (affirming a change in custody to a father when "Mother has exhibited an 
unwillingness to facilitate the child's visitation with Father"). 
We recognize Father initially yielded to Children's wishes and allowed for 
more flexibility in deciding when to visit with him. However, as the email  
exchanges demonstrate, Mother continued to refuse or thwart visitation efforts 
even after Father sought to enforce the agreement because weeks would pass 
without him seeing Children. The email exchanges directly contradict Mother's 
testimony that she was unaware Father sought the visitation allotted in the order.  
Moreover, Mother continued these actions after the contempt hearing began. See 
Schadel v. Schadel, 268 S.C. 50, 57, 232 S.E.2d 17, 20 (1977) (holding the family
court erred in failing to hold a mother in contempt after she "refused visitation" of 
the father with their children in contravention of family court orders).  
We find the instant case is distinguishable from Nash v. Byrd, 298 S.C. 530, 
534-35, 381 S.E.2d 913, 915-16 (Ct. App. 1989), in which this court affirmed the 
family court's declination to hold a mother in contempt. In Nash, the mother 
would not force a child to visit his father after she would prepare the child for 
visitation, but the child would refuse to get in the car with the father. Id.  This  
court observed the child suffered severe physical and emotional problems  as a  
result of the visits, the visitation problems were caused by the father's conduct, and 
the mother took all reasonable steps to resolve the problems. Id.  Here, the record
is devoid of evidence demonstrating Children suffered any psychological disorders 
or physical harm as a result of visiting with Father or the visitation problems were 
caused by Father. In fact, during oral arguments, this court specifically asked
Mother whether visitation with Father caused Children any psychological or 
physical harm, which Mother unequivocally denied. Rather, Mother did not  
require Children to visit with Father because Children did not want to and Mother
disagreed with the notion of scheduling visitation. 
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Our jurisprudence has little case law addressing this issue—holding a 
custodial parent in contempt for his or her refusal to require minor children to visit 
the noncustodial parent against the children's wishes—however, in the absence of 
psychological or physical harm, most jurisdictions would support finding the 
behavior Mother displayed was willful disobedience and constituted contempt.6 
See Schotz v. Oliver, 361 So. 2d 605, 606 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978) (affirming a 
finding of contempt when a mother "informed the court that she was not willing to 
force the unwilling child to visit with respondent as directed by the court. Nor 
[was] she willing to forcibly remove the child from the car in order to deliver 
custody to respondent. If the child were willing to visit respondent, [the mother] 
says she would comply with the order by delivering the child to the designated 
location"); Clark v. Atkins, 489 N.E.2d 90, 97 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (affirming a 
finding of contempt when a mother did not require the children to visit with their 
father, rejecting the contemptuous mother's argument that her minor children's 
refusal to visit their father justified her noncompliance with a visitation order); 
Pratt v. Spaulding, 822 A.2d 1183, 1187 (Me. 2003) (affirming a finding of 
contempt when the mother "explicitly refused [the father]'s request for contact with 
his son on two days when such contact was required by court order. Subsequently, 
by not answering her phone, by refusing to return calls, and by having her phone 
disconnected, she rendered the child unavailable for contact with [the father] for 
approximately two months, until he brought the contempt motion"); Casbergue v. 
Casbergue, 335 N.W.2d 16, 18 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) ("[The mother] testified that 
she told her daughters that they were required to visit their father by the visitation 
order but that she did not impose any discipline to make it clear that she expected 
the children to comply with the order.  We hold that the trial court did not err . . . in
finding [the mother] guilty of contempt for violation of the order."); In re Marriage
of Marez & Marshall, 340 P.3d 520, 527 (Mont. 2014) ("[W]here a parent fails to 
make reasonable efforts to require a recalcitrant child to attend visitation as 
provided for in a parenting plan, the parent has not made a good faith effort to 
comply with the parenting plan, and a contempt order may be appropriate."); Smith 
v. Smith, 434 N.E.2d 749, 752 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980) (affirming the trial court's 
finding the custodial parent in contempt for failing to abide by a visitation order, 
6 See Rice v. Rice, 335 S.C. 449, 456-64, 517 S.E.2d 220, 224-28 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(surveying case law from other jurisdictions because South Carolina case law 
provided "little guidance" as to how a court should decide a specific custody issue 
and relying on case law from varying jurisdictions to support its holding).   
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holding the custodial parent interfered with the noncustodial parent's visitation 
rights by using "the children's reluctance to visit [the noncustodial parent] as an 
excuse to thwart [that parent]'s right of visitation"); id. ("In the absence of proof 
showing that visitation with the defendant would cause physical or mental harm to
the children or a showing of some justification for preventing visitation, the
plaintiff must do more than merely encourage the minor children to visit the 
defendant." (emphasis added)). 
The above-cited approach of various jurisdictions is consistent with our 
state's policy to ensure minor children of divorce are not estranged from the
noncustodial parent. See McGregor v. McGregor, 255 S.C. 179, 183, 177 S.E.2d 
599, 600 (1970) ("The general rule is that minor children, notwithstanding the 
divorce, are entitled to the love and companionship of both parents, and the well[-
]rounded development of a normal child demands an association with both 
parents."). Therefore, we find the above-cited cases instructive, but limit our 
holding in this regard to the facts presented and do not suggest that in every 
situation in which a custodial parent fails to force a child to visit a noncustodial 
parent, such custodial parent should be held in contempt. A contempt finding is 
determined on a case-by-case basis.  The finding was appropriate here because not 
only did Mother coin the negative term "forced visitation," she emboldened 
Children in their refusal to visit Father, alienated Father by imparting to Children
scheduling visitation was inappropriate, and refused to facilitate visitation or set a
schedule. 
In any event, notwithstanding Mother's failure to "force" or facilitate 
visitation by requiring visitation against Children's wishes, Mother's additional 
actions support a finding of contempt. Mother argues she did not interfere with or 
fail to promote Father's relationship with Children, and she did not disparage 
Father or encourage disparagement of Father by Children. Further, she argues the 
family court erred in finding she failed to exert every reasonable effort to maintain 
free access and unhampered contact between Children and Father as required by 
the court order. We disagree. Mother nonchalantly admitted she allowed Son to 
block Father's phone number from his cell phone without providing any 
consequences.7 Further, Father testified—and the emails indicate—his calls to 
7 Daughter blocked Father's phone number from her cell phone one month before 
the divorce order. However, Son blocked Father's number over a year after
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Mother, Children, and the family home went unanswered or unreturned.8 
Additionally, Mother admitted she allowed Children to disinvite Father from social 
or school events and she either did not inform Father of Children's school events or 
asked Father to leave events he attended; and, she made Children aware of her 
requests that he leave.  
Furthermore, we find Mother's actions and her failure to administer any 
consequences for Children's behavior toward Father estranged Children from 
Father, encouraged disparagement of Father, and injured Children's opinion of 
Father in violation of the divorce order. Mother admitted that during a January 11,
2013 instance—the exchange that ultimately led to Father finally filing the instant 
contempt action—when Mother met Father with Children, Children refused to get 
out of the car, asserting Father would have to "drag them out of the car"; and
stating, "Are [you] going to use your manly muscles to make me or something" 
and "we're not going with you, you moron." Mother admitted she should have 
corrected Children's behavior in the moment but she did not. Mother testified, she 
"was quiet for a moment.  [Then she]  said to  [Father],  .  .  .  [']This is between the
two of you. This is between you and the children. Talk to them and explain.'" We 
find Mother's inaction in this regard and her passive acquiescence of Children 
disparaging Father was a willful violation of the court order.9 
visitation began. Mother admitted both blocks only lasted three months and 
Children reinitiated the blocks each time they expired. 
8 Mother's arguments on appeal are contradictory in that on one hand, she argues 
the cell phone blocks did not prevent Father's communication with Children 
"because he could reach them by email and the house telephone."  Yet, on the other 
hand, she notes, "With respect to the claim of unanswered calls on the house 
phone, Father acknowledged that the only land line in the house could not be heard 
throughout the entire house or from outside." Given Father's voicemails on the 
landline were unreturned, Mother's logic would leave Father to communicate with
minor children by email only.
9 See Commonwealth ex rel. Ermel v. Ermel, 469 A.2d 682, 684 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1983) (affirming a finding of contempt when a father pleaded with the mother "to 
assist him by talking to the child or helping him get her to the car [for visitation], 
but [the mother] said nothing and looked at the ceiling"); Rideout v. Rideout, 40 
P.3d 1192, 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (noting "[m]ost importantly" in its finding 
of contempt against a mother that the mother improperly maintained any dispute
about the child's visitation with the father was between the child and the father), 
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Moreover, Mother, a licensed clinical psychologist, did not foster "a feeling 
of affections" between Children and Father as required by court order; instead, the 
evidence supports the family court finding Mother hampered the free and natural
development of Children's love and respect for Father.  The record is replete with
evidence showing Mother hovered over Children's every move and interaction with
Father, perpetuated the idea of alienation, and supported their emotional distance 
from Father. In one example among many, Mother interfered with Father's attempt
to build a relationship with Children after he invited Children's friends to a 
visitation dinner. Mother called some of the friends and canceled the dinner 
arrangements. Mother admitted that when Father would not disclose all of the 
invited friends, she told Father, "'Please don't make me call all of their friends to 
try to find out who it  is [Father invited to the dinner].  I just don't -- the children 
don't want their friends there.'" She further testified, "Their dad has never asked 
them if they wanted their friends there. So they were re[al]ly upset by that. That's 
why I did what I did. If the children had[] wanted their friends, I wouldn't have 
even [] gotten involved; but it was going to be a surprise for them, and they were
very upset." Mother's behavior in this regard was a violation of the court order.  
See Roy  T. Stuckey,  Marital Litigation in South Carolina, 581 (4th ed. 2010) 
(noting South Carolina case law holds the "custodial parent should not have 
unfettered freedom to control all aspects of visitation with the noncustodial 
parent"). 
Dr. Foster, an expert in clinical psychology, opined Mother's
communications and behaviors (1) indicated a strategy to block and thwart
visitation as agreed to; (2) suggested a passive-aggressive approach to sabotage 
visitations; (3) undermined Father; and (4) demonstrated Mother, as the controlling 
agent, encouraging Children to campaign against Father. Further, Dr. Foster 
opined Mother's behavior created a "loyalty bind" for Children, in which they 
aff'd, In re Marriage of Rideout, 77 P.3d 1174 (Wash. 2003); id. ("[The mother]
wants to cast herself in the role of a bystander without the power or right to require 
that [the child] follow the parenting plan. But the law imposes a greater 
responsibility on [the mother]. She, not [the child], bears the primary 
responsibility to ensure that [the child] visit with her father according to the 
parenting plan. And she must, in good faith, make every effort to require [the  
child] to do so." (emphases added)). 
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could not simultaneously enjoy both parents. Mother's behavior "triangulat[ed] the 
children, creating an alignment between one parent and the children, and creating 
toxic circumstances to increase the likelihood that they will reject the other parent."
Dr. Foster was concerned about whether Mother had any "investment in being a 
good-faith gatekeeper of the relationship between the father and the children."  
Moreover, Dr. Foster opined Mother was unsupportive of Father and created an
age-inappropriate toxic dynamic by empowering Children and placing them in the 
middle of the conflict.
Dr. Foster admitted Father's act of initially leaving the issue of visitation to
Children gave Children too much authority and power and sent mixed messages.
However, she opined this issue was Mother's fault and Father was not at fault 
because:
[H]e's the rejected and estranged parent, and he's the one 
who's being denied access. She's the gatekeeper. She's
been entrusted by the Court with that position as primary 
custodial parent, and it's my observation that this was a 
father who was making a wide range of attempts to honor 
the wishes of his children and his ex-wife and still seek 
access and visitation.
Based on the foregoing, and mindful that contempt is an extreme measure, 
we affirm as Mother has failed to persuade us that the family court's contempt 
finding was not supported by the evidence. See Hawkins v. Mullins, 359 S.C. 497, 
501, 597 S.E.2d 897, 899 (Ct. App. 2004) ("Before a party may be found in
contempt, the record must clearly and specifically show the contemptuous 
conduct."); id. ("On appeal, the appellate court may reverse a [family court]'s 
determination regarding contempt only if it is without evidentiary support or is an
abuse of discretion."). 
Father's initial attempts to appease Children by informally agreeing to a
flexible visitation schedule and abide by their wishes did not change the fact that
he had a court-ordered right to a specific amount of visitation.  See Miles v. Miles, 
355 S.C. 511, 519, 586 S.E.2d 136, 140 (Ct. App. 2003) ("It is axiomatic that
parties cannot modify a court order."). Moreover, the record suggests Father's
initial flexibility was an attempt to maintain a relationship with Children in the 
midst of Mother imparting to Children her problems with being "forced" to visit 
with her own father and Mother's unwillingness to require Children to abide by a 
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visitation schedule as mandated by the court order. The record supports the family 
court finding Father "in good faith intended to placate and ease tensions in order to
proceed toward implementation of his court-ordered parenting time." Accordingly, 
a finding of contempt was appropriate because Father's attempts to exercise his
rights were improperly and willfully frustrated by Mother's actions and inactions.  
See Hawkins, 359 S.C. at 503, 597 S.E.2d at 900 (reversing the family court's 
failure to find a mother in contempt for failing to produce the child for summer  
visitation).10 
II. Attorney's Fees and Costs 
Because we affirm the family court's overall contempt findings, we also
affirm the award of  attorney's fees and  costs.  Regardless  of whether the family
court applied the E.D.M. factors or compensatory contempt doctrine,11 the family 
court correctly determined Father was entitled to attorney's fees. Mother has a 
gross monthly income of $23,451, including her salary, alimony, and child support.  
10 Because we find this issue is dispositive, we decline to reach Mother's arguments 
regarding admitting evidence and limiting cross-examination. See Futch v.
McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 
(1999) (noting an appellate court need not address remaining issues on appeal 
when the resolution of a prior issue is dispositive). Moreover, our decision on 
those two issues would not change the ultimate disposition of this case. See Weir 
v. Citicorp Nat. Servs., Inc., 312 S.C. 511, 517, 435 S.E.2d 864, 868 (1993) 
(holding the exclusion of cumulative evidence was not prejudicial error); Recco
Tape and Label Co. v. Barfield, 312 S.C. 214, 216, 439 S.E.2d 838, 840 (1994) 
(holding to warrant reversal, the appellant "must show both the error of the ruling
and resulting prejudice"). 
11 See Miller v. Miller, 375 S.C. 443, 463, 652 S.E.2d 754, 764 (Ct. App. 2007) 
("Courts, by exercising their contempt power, can award attorney's fees under a 
compensatory contempt theory."); id. ("Compensatory contempt seeks to reimburse 
the party for the costs it incurs in forcing the non-complying party to obey the 
court's orders."); E.D.M. v. T.A.M., 307 S.C. 471, 415 S.E.2d 812 (1992) (stating 
that when determining whether an attorney's fee should be awarded, the following 
factors should be considered: "(1) the party's ability to pay his/her own attorney's
fee; (2) beneficial results obtained by the attorney; (3) the parties' respective 
financial conditions; and (4) effect of the attorney's fee on each party's standard of 
living"). 
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She has over $5 million in savings. Mother's payment of the attorney's fees and 
costs would not affect her standard of living in any meaningful way. Accordingly,
we affirm the award of attorney's fees. See Whetstone v. Whetstone, 309 S.C. 227,
235, 420 S.E.2d 877, 881 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding the family court properly
awarded a wife attorney's fees incurred as the result of her husband's contempt). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the family court's order in its entirety.  
AFFIRMED. 
HUFF and KONDUROS, JJ., concur. 
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